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The Doctrine of Primary Jurisdiction:
Was It Inverted?
I. ABSTRACT
This Comment traces the development of the administrative law
doctrine of primary jurisdiction from its inception in early twen-
tieth century interstate commerce cases through the so-called "in-
version" in 1962 to its application to several antitrust cases in 1973.
In general terms the doctrine of primary jurisdiction states that
the courts will not determine a question within the jurisdiction of
an administrative tribunal prior to a decision by that tribunal.
This doctrine is applied when the expertise of the agency is desired
or when a uniformity of ruling is important. However a corollary
to the doctrine has developed recently. The courts retain primary
jurisdiction in antitrust matters when Congress has not specifically
legislated to the contrary. The corollary is applied since neither
the expertise of the agency nor a uniformity of ruling in the rate-
making sense is essential in an antitrust case.
II. STATEMENT OF THE DOCTRINE: EARLY CASES
The foundation case on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction is
Texas & Pac. Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co.' This case was
an action by an oil company to recover excessive rate charges which
constituted an undue preference by the railroad. The net result
of the rate policy was that the oil company was charged more for
a short haul than for a long one. The action was instituted in state
court and was appealed to the United States Supreme Court after
the Texas Court of Civil Appeals reversed in favor of the oil com-
pany. The defendant railroad appealed to the Supreme Court on
the basis that remedies created by the Interstate Commerce Act
must be pursued in the federal courts or before the Interstate
Commerce Commission. The Supreme Court found the main issue
to be2
1. 204 U.S. 426 (1907).
2. Id. at 436.
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...the scope and effect of the act to regulate commerce upon the
right of a shipper to maintain an action at law against a common
carrier to recover damages because of the exaction of an alleged
unreasonable rate, although the rate collected and complained of
was the rate stated in the schedule filed with the Interstate Com-
merce Commission ...and which it was the duty of the carrier
under the law to enforce as against shippers.
The Court disposed of the federal jurisdiction question and the
effect of the I.C.C. regulation as a single issue by holding that the
jurisdiction of the I.C.C. precluded suits by plaintiff on common
law rights in either state or federal court. The Court reasoned that
... if the power existed in both courts and the Commission to
originally hear complaints on this subject, there might be a diver-
gence between the action of the Commission and the decision of a
court. In other words, the established schedule might be found
reasonable by the Commission in the first instance and unreason-
able by a court acting originally, and thus a conflict would arise
which would render the enforcement of the act impossible.
This is a clear statement by the court of the policy regarding pri-
mary jurisdiction. It is invoked to avoid major conflict between
administrative agencies and the courts and is consistently applied
throughout the litigation traced by this Comment. This clear,
common-sense approach was arrived at by side-stepping an obstacle
in the statute itself:4
Sec. 22 of the act to regulate commerce, viz: . . . Nothing in
this act contained shall in any way abridge or alter the remedies
now existing at common law or by statute, but the provisions
of this act are in addition to such remedies." This clause, how-
ever, cannot in reason be construed as continuing in shippers a
common law right, the continued existence of which would be
absolutely inconsistent with the provisions of the act. In other
words, the act cannot be held to destroy itself.
Plaintiff oil company's case had been founded on a right apparently
granted by the statute. However, the court construed the statute
in a fashion which denied an apparent common law right which
would have defeated the intent of the statute as a whole. The court
concluded that the Interstate Commerce Commission alone had
original power to entertain proceedings for the alteration of an
established schedule and remanded the case for further proceedings
consistent with the opinion.5
3. Id. at 441.
4. Id. at 446.
5. Id. at 448.
The role of the courts as opposed to the administrative agencies
was further refined in Great Northern Ry. Co. v. Merchants
Elevator Co.6 This suit was an action brought in state court by
an elevator company to recover $80 alleged to have been exacted
in violation of the tariff filed with the Interstate Commerce Com-
mission. The question was whether a reconsignment charge was
applicable when a railroad car was reconsigned from an initial
destination or whether the charge was inapplicable under an excep-
tion if the stop at the intermediate station was for inspection pur-
poses. The specific issue was whether the general rule or the excep-
tion applied. Nevertheless the Court saw a broader issue as well: 7
The question argued before us is not whether the state courts erred
in construing or applying the tariff, but whether any court had
jurisdiction of the controversy, in view of the fact that the Inter-
state Commerce Commission had not passed upon the disputed
question of construction.
The court held that construction of a tariff was a question of law
to be decided by a court. Preliminary resort to the Commission
is required only in two classes of cases: first, where there is a need
for determination of reasonable rates, rules or practices (a legisla-
tive or administrative function); and second, where a shipper has
been wronged by exaction of an unreasonable or discriminatory rate
(a judicial function). Preliminary resort to the Commission is re-
quired in these classes of cases because 8
... the inquiry is essentially one of fact and of discretion in tech-
nical matters; and uniformity can be secured only if its determina-
tion is left to the Commission. Moreover, that determination is
reached ordinarily upon voluminous and conflicting evidence, for
the adequate appreciation of which acquaintance with many intrin-
sic facts of transportation is indispensible; and such acquaintance
is commonly to be found only in a body of experts.
The state court decision was affirmed in favor of the shipper. In
a footnote9 the court cited cases in which the jurisdiction of the
court had been sustained without preliminary resort to the Com-
mission. This situation occurred when the question involved was
solely one of construction of a tariff and not one of administrative
discretion. In other listed cases, the Court had refused jurisdiction
because no preliminary resort to the Commission had been made
and the question presented was either one of fact or one involving
administrative discretion.
A more modem case on an issue very similar to Merchants was
6. 259 U.S. 285 (1922).
7. Id. at 290.
8. Id. at 291.
9. Id. at 295, n.2.
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United States v. Western Pac. Ry. Co.10 in which the court elab-
orated on the history, principles and policy of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction. Three railroads sued in the Court of Claims
to recover from the government an overcharge resulting from the
classification of napalm bombs shipped without burster charges and
fuses as "incendiary bombs" rather than as "gasoline in steel
drums." The "bombs" were steel cases filled with gasoline thick-
ened by the addition of aluminum soap powder. The government
paid the lower gasoline rate, and the railroads sued to recover the
higher incendiary bomb rate. The government defended on the
theory that the higher rate was unreasonable and such a question
should first be referred to the Interstate Commerce Commission.
The Court of Claims entered summary judgment for the railroads,
but on certiorari the Supreme Court reversed and held that on the
issue of tariff construction the dispute was within the exclusive
primary jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. The
court commented at length on the policy behind the rule:"
In the earlier cases emphasis was laid on the desirable uniformity
which would obtain if initially a specialized agency passed on cer-
tain types of administrative questions. [Abilene was cited.] More
recently the expert and specialized knowledge of the agencies in-
volved has been particularly stressed [citation omitted.] The two
factors are part of the same principle, "now firmly established, that
in cases raising issues of fact not within the conventional experi-
ence of judges or cases requiring the exercise of administrative dis-
cretion, agencies created by Congress for regulating the subject
matter should not be passed over .... Uniformity and consist-
ency in the regulation of business entrusted to a particular agency
are secured, and the limited functions of review by the judiciary
are more rationally exercised, by preliminary resort for ascertain-
ing and interpreting the circumstances underlying legal issues to
agencies that are better equipped than the courts by specialization,
by insight gained through experience, and by more flexible pro-
cedure." [Citation omitted.]
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction thus does "more than pre-
scribe the mere procedural timetable of the lawsuit. It is a doctrine
allocating the law-making power over certain aspects 'of commer-
cial relations' ". "It transfers from court to agency the power to
determine" some of the incidents of such relations.
Writers have not been in agreement as to the weight and mean-
10. 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
11. Id. at 64-5.
ing of the above paragraph.12 Interpretation becomes easier, how-
ever, as the rule is developed in succeeding cases. The doctrine
of primary jurisdiction, as expressed in Western, helps to explain
the decisions in the antitrust cases treated below.
In Western the court retreated from the position taken in
Merchants, refusing to consider whether the commodity in question
was a bomb or drummed gasoline and calling it a question of fact
for the agency to decide because of its expertise. Justice Douglas
dissented on the ground that the principles of Merchants were
applicable to Western.1" The court in 1922 was willing to take upon
itself the task of interpreting the meaning of a railroad rate tariff,
but was not willing in 1956 to attempt the interpretation of tariff
rates for gasoline and bombs. The difference is in the approach,
not in the subject matter. That is, the more recent Supreme Court
approach to the interpretation of regulations such as railroad tariffs
is to defer to the expertise of the administrative agency. This is
true whether the subject matter is reconsignment charges as in
Merchants, or gasoline and bombs as in Western.
III. THE SO-CALLED "INVERSION" OF THE DOCTRINE
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction was clearly announced in
the Western decision. But in 1962 the Court appeared to take a
different direction in the antitrust case California v. FPC.14 El
Paso Natural Gas Company had acquired the stock of the Pacific
Northwest Pipeline Corp. and then applied to the Federal Power
Commission for authority to acquire the assets pursuant to section
7 of the Natural Gas Act.1 5 This request was made less than one
month after the Department of Justice had commenced an action
under the Clayton Act against El Paso Natural Gas, charging that
the stock acquisition was illegal. El Paso's motion to dismiss or
delay the antitrust suit was denied. The Department of Justice
then asked the Federal Power Commission to delay its proceedings
pending the outcome of the antitrust suit. The FPC refused but
invited the Department of Justice to participate in the administra-
tive hearings, but it did not. The FPC obtained a continuance of
the antitrust suit in the District Court until the administrative pro-
12. K.D. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE LAw TREATISE, § 19.01 at 5 (1958); L.
Kastenbaum, PRIMARY JURISDICTION TO DECIDE ANTITRUST JURISDICTION: A
PRACTICAL APPROACH TO THE ALLOCATION OF FUNCTIONS, 55 GEO. L.J. 812, 813
(1967).
13. U.S. v. Western Pac. Ry. Co., 352 U.S. 59, 76 (1956).
14. 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
15. 15 U.S.C. § 717f(c) (1938).
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ceedings were concluded. The merger was ultimately approved and
became effective on December 31, 1959.
California, having intervened in the administrative proceedings,
obtained review by the Court of Appeals and then by the Supreme
Court. The latter reversed the judgment of the Court of Appeals,
vacated the FPC order approving the merger, and remanded the
case to the Commission, holding that the FPC should not have pro-
ceeded to a decision while the antitrust suit was pending: 16
Our function is to see that the policy entrusted to the courts is not
frustrated by an administrative agency. Where the primary juris-
diction is in the agency, courts withhold action until the agency
has acted. [Abilene cited]. The converse should also be true, lest
the antitrust policy whose enforcement Congress in this situation
has entrusted to the courts is in practical effect taken over by the
Federal Power Commission.
The Court further supported its decision by pointing out that where
the FPC approves a merger and the courts later hold it to be ille-
gal in an antitrust suit, an unscrambling becomes necessary. The
FPC action may also tend to influence any subsequent decision by
the court.
The California decision has not received favorable comment from
legal scholars. Professor K.D. Davis called it a "surprising decision,
seemingly running counter to other recent developments . . .-.
Professor E. Gelhorn also commented unfavorably:'3
There is one surprising and aberrant case in this area, however,
where the Supreme Court inverted the doctrine and then applied
it to require the FPC to delay consideration . . .until an antitrust
court could rule upon the merger's legality, California v. FPC....
However, applying the factual situation in California the twofold
test set forth in Western of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
results in jurisdiction being given to the courts. First, in California
the expertise of the administrative tribunal was not necessary to
decide a question of fact-the courts routinely decide antitrust
issues by themselves. Second, in California a uniformity of ruling
was not essential in order to comply with the purposes of a regula-
tory statute. Antitrust decisions are not continuous processes of
16. California v. F.P.C., 369 U.S. 482, 491 (1962).
17. K.C. DAvis, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 19.06 at 635 (Supp.
1970).
18. E. GELLHORN, AMINISTRATIvE LAW AND PROCESS IN A NUTSHELL.
regulation like rate-making, but infrequent actions. Therefore, in
review the California decision (1962) is neither surprising nor
aberrant. The case is entirely consistent with the rule set forth
in Western (1956) and the primary jurisdiction doctrine established
by Abilene (1907).
In addition to the determination of primary jurisdiction on the
basis of the need for administrative expertise and uniformity of
rules, the issue of Congressional intent in regard to who shall en-
force antitrust laws is also pertinent and was examined in Califor-
nia. Is the Clayton Act to be enforced by the courts or by the
administrative agency? The Clayton Act provides that'
Nothing contained in this section shall apply to transactions duly
consummated pursuant to authority given by the ... Federal
Power Commission ... under any statutory provision vesting such
power in such Commission.
Professor K.C. Davis states that this statute should have given the
court difficulty. 20 But the court in California did not hesitate to
reaffirm its power by denying power in the FPC by stating:21
The words "transactions duly consummated pursuant to authority"
given the Commission "under any statutory provision vesting such
power" in it are plainly not a grant of power to adjudicate antitrust
issues.
Confusion on this point stems in part from the fact that Congress
granted some commissions the sole authority to adjudicate antitrust
issues but did not grant such power to others: 22
[Congress] . . . has included in many regulatory statutes either an
express exemption from the antitrust laws, or a "saving clause",
providing that the antitrust laws remain applicable despite agency
approval of a transaction. Congress has, however, remained silent
on this issue in three regulatory statutes: The Bank Merger Act,
the Federal Power Act, and the Natural Gas Act.
In summary, the correct interpretation of California is that the
doctrine of primary jurisdiction was considered and correctly
applied. The primary issue was an antitrust issue and, pursuant
to Congressional intent, the court and not the agency was to decide
it. A supporting reason for the decision was that an "unscram-
bling" would be called for should the agency approve the merger
and the court later disapprove. Moreover, the decision of the
19. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950), formerly ch. 25 § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
20. K.C. DAVIs, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW TREATISE, § 19.06, at 63536 (Supp.
1970).
21. 369 U.S. 482, 486.
22. Comment, The Applicability of the Antitrust Laws to Combinations
Approved Under the Bank Merger Act, Federal Power Act and Natural Gas
Act, 37 N.Y.U.L. REv. 735, 737 (1962).
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agency would prejudice the government's antitrust suit. But
neither the necessity for administrative expertise nor the require-
ment of uniformity of ruling basic to fixing primary jurisdiction
in an administrative agency was present in California. As a con-
sequence, primary jurisdiction was found to be that of the courts.
The Court noted that the application of the doctrine of primary
jurisdiction did not always result in allocation of the controversy
to the administrative agency. Criteria had been established: those
cases meeting the criteria were to be handled by the administrative
tribunal. The corollary inference from this proposition is that cases
not meeting this criteria are to be handled by the courts. This view
is a consistent application of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
and not an inversion of it.
IV. CLARIFICATION OF THE DocTRINE: 1973 CASES
That California is the correct interpretation of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction is supported by the Supreme Court's reaffirm-
ing references to it in subsequent decisions. Four recent cases that
touch on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction cite California as valid
law: Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exchange,23 Otter Tail Power
Co. v. United States,24 FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,25 and Gulf
State Utilities Co. v. FPC.26
In Ricci, plaintiff-petitioner had filed an antitrust complaint
charging the Chicago Mercantile Exchange with conspiring to
restrain his business by transferring his exchange membership to
another person in violation of both the Commodity Exchange Act
and the Sherman Act. The Supreme Court decided that the anti-
trust proceedings should be stayed until the Commodity Exchange
Commission had acted. In effect, the Commission was held to have
primary jurisdiction because of the expertise of the administrative
tribunal: 27
We also think it very likely that a prior agency adjudication of this
dispute will be a material aid in ultimately deciding whether the
Commodity Exchange Act forecloses this antitrust suit, a matter
23. 409 U.S. 289 (1973).
24. 410 U.S. 366 (1973).
25. 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
26. 411 U.S. 747 (1973).
27. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 305 (1973).
that seems to depend in the first instance on whether. the transfer
of Ricci's membership was in violation of the Act for failure to
follow exchange rules. That issue in turn appears to pose issues
of fact and questions about the scope, meaning and significance of
Exchange membership rules. These are matters that should be
dealt with in the first instance by those especially familiar with
the customs and practices of the industry and of the unique market-
place involved in this case.
California v. FPC was cited as an example of the conflict between
court and agency adjudication of antitrust issues. 2s California was
also cited in support of the rule that when Congress does not
expressly give an agency jurisdiction to decide antitrust issues, the
jurisdiction is left in the courts.29 Application of the doctrine of
primary jurisdiction had a different result in Ricci than in Califor-
nia because a need for the expertise of the administrative agency
was found.
The dissenting opinion by Justice Marshall in Ricci also cited
California. The dissent stressed that staying the court action pend-
ing the agency decision would result in a delaying of petitioner's
remedy with little likelihood of a fair hearing on his complaint:8 0
It has been argued that the doctrine of primary jurisdiction
involves a mere postponement, rather than relinquishment of
judicial jurisdiction .... However, that observation should not
be taken to mean that invocation of the doctrine therefore imposes
no costs. On the contrary, in these days of crowded dockets and
long court delays, the doctrine frequently prolongs and complicates
litigation. More fundamentally, invocation of the doctrine dero-
gates from the principle that except in extraordinary situations,
every citizen is entitled to call upon the judiciary for expeditious
vindiction of his legal claims of right. As we have said in a some-
what different context "due process requires, at a minimum, that
absent a countervailing state interest of overriding significance,
persons forced to settle their claims of right and duty through thejudicial process must be given a meaningful opportunity to be
heard". Boddie v. Connecticut 401 U.S. 371, 377 (1971). And surely
the right to a "meaningful opportunity to be heard" comprehends
within it the right to be heard without unreasonable delay. This
principle is especially worthy of protection in the antitrust field
where it is unmistakably clear that Congress has given the courts,
rather than the agencies, the primary duty to act. Cf. California
v. FPC 369 U.S. 482, 487-490 (1962).
Thus, in both the majority and minority opinions in Ricci, California
v. FPC represents the law applicable to antitrust issues before
certain administrative agencies. The difference between the major-
ity opinion and the dissent is perhaps explained by the comment
28. Id. at 300.
29. Id. at 302.
30. Id. at 320.
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in the dissenting opinion to the effect that "the majority's scale
is apparently differently calibrated."81
In Otter Tail, the Federal Power Act was again involved in an
antitrust case in California. The Department of Justice sued under
the Sherman Act to enjoin certain monopolistic and anticompetitive
practices of the Otter Tail Power Co. Defendant claimed that by
reason of the Federal Power Act it was not subject to antitrust
regulation for refusing to sell power at wholesale prices to munic-
ipal power systems. The Supreme Court held that Otter Tail was
not insulated from antitrust regulation by reason of the Federal
Power Act and could be compelled by injunction to participate in
interconnections with municipal systems. California was cited to
support the argument that being subject to regulation by the FPC
was not a bar to an antitrust suit.82
Justice Stewart's partial dissent in Otter Tail questioned the
court's giving administrative agency preference in Ricci but not in
Otter Tail: 18
It seems to me that the principles of Ricci, related to but not
identical with the traditional doctrine of "primary jurisdiction",
should require a District Court in a case like this one to defer to
the Commission proceeding then in progress. Surely the regulatory
authority of the Commission with respect to interconnection is at
least as substantial as the responsibility of the Commodity Ex-
change Commission, in Ricci, for the implementation of reasonable
membership practices by its regulated contract markets.
In short, Justice Stewart would follow Ricci and give primary jur-
isdiction to the agency. But the above statement by Justice
Stewart is confusing in several respects. First, as this Comment
has pointed out, Ricci can be read as being consistent with the
traditional doctrine of primary jurisdiction, contrary to the opinion
of Justice Stewart. Second, Justice Stewart joined in the dissent
in Ricci,84 which argued that the court action should not be stayed
pending the outcome of the administrative proceeding. In doing
so, he accused the majority of being inconsistent between Ricci and
Otter Tail.
There were other dissenting voices in Otter Tail. The majority
31. Id. at 321.
32. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 373 (1973).
33. Id. at 392-93.
34. Ricci v. Chicago Mercantile Exch., 409 U.S. 289, 309 (1973).
(Justices Douglas, Brennan, White and Marshall) were supported
by Chief Justice Burger and Justices Stewart and Rehnquist only
on the point that the case should be remanded to decide whether
certain litigation instituted by Otter Tail Power Co. was in itself
a violation of the antitrust laws. 5  In addition to the reference
to the difference in result between Ricci and Otter Tail, Justice
Stewart's dissent-in-part also argues that the administrative agency
had primary jurisdiction by intent of Congress:80
With respect to decisions by regulated electric utilitites as to
whether or not to provide nonretail services, I think that in the
absence of horizontal conspiracy, the teaching of the "primary
jurisdiction" cases argues for leaving governmental regulation to
the Commission instead of the invariably less sensitive and less
specifically expert process of antitrust litigation. I believe this is
what Congress intended by declining to impose common carrier
obligations on companies like Otter Tail, and by entrusting the
Commission with the burden of "assuring an abundant supply of
electrical energy throughout the United States" and with the power
to order interconnections when necessary in the public interest.
This is an area where "sporadic action by federal courts" can "work
mischief."
What weight should be given to the view of Justice Stewart? It
appears that the majority of the court would retain primary juris-
diction over antitrust issues within the province of the courts except
where Congress has explicitly given such jurisdiction to administra-
tive agencies or in certain areas where the court has given prefer-
ence to the "expertise" of the agencies. It has not done so on the
larger antitrust issues such as mergers and interconnections. In
California and Ricci, Justice Stewart concurred with the dissenting
view; in Otter Tail, he was the author of the dissent. The current
view of the court seems to follow California, not as an inversion
of the doctrine of primary jurisdiction, however, but as a corollary
consistent with it.
In FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc.,"7 the issue was whether Congress
had granted the Federal Maritime Commission (FMC) the power
to approve merger agreements between shipping lines even where
such agreements were violative of the antitrust laws and even
though the Commission had taken antitrust principles into account
in reaching its decision. The FMC argued that a one-time merger
or acquisition-of-assets agreement was within Commission jurisdic-
tion as an agreement "controlling, regulating, preventing or de-
35. Otter Tail Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 382 (1973); re-
hearing denied, 411 U.S. 910 (1973).
36. Id. at 391-92.
37. 411 U.S. 726 (1973).
[VOL. 2: 190, 1974] Primary Jurisdiction
PEPPERDINE LAW REVIEW
stroying competition. s3 8  The Supreme Court, in a unanimous
opinion by Justice Marshall, refused to allow a broad reading of
the statute to include the merger in question as within the sole
authority of the Commission to grant approval, holding that it
would conflict with the Court's frequently expressed view that
exemptions from antitrust laws are strictly construed. Quoting
from Otter Tail and citing California and other cases, the Court
stated:3 9
When ... relationships are governed in the first instance by
business judgment and not regulatory coercion, courts must be
hesitant to conclude that Congress intended to override the funda-
mental national policy embodied in the antitrust laws.
In a footnote,40 the court interpreted the 1950 amendment to sec-
tion 7 of the Clayton Act 41 as it had in California42 to the effect
that no new or stronger power to adjudicate antitrust issues had
been granted any administrative agency by that amendment.
'In Gulf States Utilities Co. v. FPC43 another instance of conflict
between an agency and the courts over antitrust law enforcement
was decided against the agency. In Gulf, the conflict was not as
direct as in the previous cases. In this instance, the court did not
take the decision away from the agency but made it mandatory
that the agency take antitrust policy into consideration. Gulf
States Utilities Co. had applied to the Federal Power Commission
for authorization of a bond issue to refinance its short term debt.
The application was required by section 204 of the Federal Power
Act. 44 The cities of Lafayette and Plaquemine, Louisiana, filed
a protest and petition to intervene in the proceedings, contending
that the bond issue should not be approved because the proceeds
would be used to finance activities in violation of the antitrust laws.
The FPC granted the cities' petition to intervene but denied their
request for a hearing. The Court of Appeals remanded the case
for the consideration of the cities' claim. The Supreme Court
38. Id. at 732.
39. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 733 (1973); Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 374 (1973).
40. FMC v. Seatrain Lines, Inc., 411 U.S. 726, 743-44 n.11 (1973).
41. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1950), formerly ch. 25, § 7, 38 Stat. 631 (1914).
42. 369 U.S. 482 (1962).
43. 411 U.S. 747 (1973), rehearing denied, 412 U.S. 944.
44. 16 U.S.C. § 824(c).
affirmed 6-3, holding that the FPC must consider the anticompeti-
tive consequences of a security issue since consideration of such
consequences provides a first line of, defense against anticompetitive
practices which might later become the subject of an antitrust pro-
ceeding. The Court cited both Otter Tail and California to support
the application of antitrust policy to FPC activities: 4 5
The Federal Power Act did not render antitrust policy irrelevant
to the Commission's regulation of the electric power industry.
Indeed, within the confines of a basic natural monopoly structure,
limited competition of the sort protected by the antitrust laws
seems to have been anticipated.
There was a dissenting opinion in the case by Justice Powell, in
which Justices Stewart and Rehnquist joined. The dissent empha-
sized two views. The first was that the Commission's position was
consistent with the statute, namely: that antitrust policy need not
be considered. However, as the previous cases have disclosed, the
courts have insisted on application of antitrust law to the power
industry. The dissenting view is an expression of the contrary posi-
tion and not the view which has consistently commanded a majority
of the court. The second view is that the court's position is incom-
patible with the public interest as represented by the factual situa-
tion: Public interest-in the form of lower rates-is served by
allowing utilities access to capital funds on favorable terms. How-
ever, the mere selling of bonds is really not the antitrust issue. The
point litigated as an antitrust issue should be how the funds so
obtained are to be used.
It is clear from the majority opinion that the Supreme Court is
interested in maintaining a strong judicial role in antitrust policy
enforcement. It effectively exercises this role when it asserts
primary jurisdiction upon request of the plaintiff and also when
it undertakes judicial review of administrative acts where the
administrative agency is required to consider antitrust policy.
V. CONCLUSION
That California v. FPC represents the current law is clear from
the 1973 decisions. That the case represents the majority view of
the Supreme Court in regard to the role of the court in antitrust
cases in those areas not specifically allocated to the agencies by Con-
gress is also evident. The California rule is not an inversion of
the classic doctrine of primary jurisdiction but a logical and
consistent corollary to it. It is only where the requirements for
45. Gulf States Util. Co. v. F.P.C., 411 U.S. 747, 759 (1973).
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administrative expertise of uniformity of ruling in the rate-making
sense are absent that primary jurisdiction in an antitrust case rests
with the courts.
PATRICK CALLAHAN
